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In the transition literature, ‘free and fair elections’ is often treated as the most important 
indicator of democratic quality.  In this article, however, we argue that ‘free deliberation 
among equals’ is in many respects a more telling measure.  On the face of it, this argument 
might strike one as implausible.  After all, the decisive moment in many transitions is the 
signing of a pact between elements in the government and opposition who are more 
concerned to protect their own interests than to explain themselves to others.  Yet while pacts 
may not be particularly deliberative, they still occasion a great deal of deliberation across 
society as a whole.  We argue that the different sites where deliberation occurs can be 
understood as forming a deliberative system.  To give substance to this idea, we then outline 
a systemic framework that may be used to describe and evaluate the deliberative capacity of 
transitional regimes.  Finally, we turn to the cases of Venezuela and Poland to illustrate the 
empirical application of this approach.  Both transitions were founded on a pact.  Yet 
differences in the nature of those pacts and the broader deliberative systems in which they 
were located tell us a lot about where those countries are today. 
 
The comparative study of democratic transitions is one of the most vibrant areas of academic 
study in politics.  The reasons why are obvious enough.  The huge social and political 
upheavals that lead to the collapse of authoritarian regimes need to be explained.  We need to 
know more about the conditions under which transitions to democracy are likely to occur and 
about the conditions under which democratic deepening is likely to take hold.  These 
questions are not merely academic but have crucial policy implications.  The international 
community spends billions of dollars every year on democracy promotion across the globe.  
Yet while lives are put at risk in both wars and popular demonstrations waged in the name of 
democracy, the fact remains that many transition countries fail to make the democratic grade.  
Despite the best efforts of the democracy promotion community to devise more effective 
policies, many countries seem to be stuck in what Thomas Carothers terms a ‘grey zone’.  
They display some of the attributes of democratic political life, including opposition parties, 
civil associations and periodic elections, but they are also marked by persistent abuses of the 
rule of law, widespread corruption, low levels of public participation between elections, poor 
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institutional performance by the state, and low levels of trust in government (Carothers 2002, 
9-10; see also Rose and Chin 2001). 
 Granted, assessing a transition’s democratic quality is notoriously difficult.  In no 
small part, what makes it so difficult is the fact that ‘transition’ and ‘democracy’ can be 
defined in different ways.  Consequently, scholars can =have very different, and sometimes 
competing, ideas about which factors are important in assessing how far a country has or has 
not come (Diamond et al. 2014, 87-98).  In this paper, we take the notion of a transition to 
entail not just the move from one form of government to another, but also the broader social 
processes and trajectories that such a move entails—in colloquial terms, we think that 
transitions need to be understood from both a ‘top down’ and a ‘bottom up’ perspective.  We 
also think that transitions need to be understood in dynamic terms.  Some transitions seem to 
begin relatively abruptly (the Arab spring countries), whereas others arguably take many 
years to gather pace (Poland).  Some transitions counties seem to be heading in one direction, 
but then change tack or slide back in the direction from whence they came (Russia).  Others 
still can be safely described as ‘consolidated’ (Spain).   
More contentiously, we define ‘democracy’ in deliberative terms.  In particular, we 
assess the ‘democratic quality’ of a country in transition in terms of its ‘deliberative 
capacity’, that is, its ability to host structures for reasoned, inclusive and consequential 
discussion (Dryzek 2009; see also Coppedge and Gerring 2011; Curato 2013).  This is in 
marked contrast to the comparative literature’s usual emphasis on elections.  For example, 
Jørgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds (2002) argue that competitive elections lie ‘at the heart’ 
of democratic transitions and in particular treat the administration of elections as essential to 
democratic quality.  In fact, some comparative scholars seem to be of the view that successful 
elections are all that is required.  In this vein, Adam Przeworski and his colleagues define 
democracy as ‘a regime in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of 
contested elections.  Only if the opposition is allowed to compete, win and assume office is a 
regime democratic’ (Przeworski et al. 1996, 50; cf. Diamond 1999, 8-10).  It is no part of our 
aim to deny the importance of elections or the importance of the civil and political liberties 
on which they ultimately depend.  Yet, as we argue, there are compelling reasons why 
deliberation warrants serious attention.  Indeed, there are certain respects in which 
deliberation needs to be treated as fundamental in assessing democratic quality.  
We develop our argument in three parts.  In the first section of this paper, we theorise 
the signal importance of deliberation as a standard for assessing the democratic quality of a 
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country in transition.  Our main argument hinges on treating ‘free and fair deliberation among 
equals’ as the basis of legitimacy for emerging democratic arrangements.  ‘Free and fair 
elections’ are obviously important too.  But ultimately our assessment of what it is that makes 
an election fair is not something that can be determined in the absence of deliberation. 
In the second section, we draw on the emerging ‘deliberative systems’ literature 
(Habermas 1996, 204-308; Dryzek 2010, 2011; Mansbridge et al. 2012) to outline a novel 
framework for describing or characterising the spaces where deliberation occurs and how 
these spaces relate to each other, and for evaluating the extent to which inclusive and 
reasoned deliberation underpins the democratic trajectory of the transition process.  We 
consider this framework to be an important contribution to the literature on democracy 
quality because it indicates how the idea of a deliberative system might be operationalised for 
actual evaluative purposes.  
In the final section, we use this framework to compare the democratic quality of two 
transition countries, Poland and Venezuela.  We selected these two cases because, in each, 
the signing of a pact between elements in the government and in the opposition, guaranteeing 
their mutual security and offering tangible rewards for cooperation in the process, was a 
decisive moment in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy (O’Donnell and 
Philippe Schmitter 1986, 38).  However, what our framework allows us to see is how 
differences between pacts can have a crucial bearing on the deliberative capacity, and hence 
democratic quality, of a transition country, not just in the short run but over the course of 
time.   
 
Why take a deliberative approach? 
 
On the face of it, one might be forgiven for thinking that transitions are all about power—the 
capacity to remove one government or constitutional order and establish another in its place 
without regard to the wishes of its officers or supporters (see Goodin 1996, 15-16).  Yet 
transitions are never just about power; they are also about the right to rule (Zartman 2008).  
Perhaps rather curiously, this is true not just of transitions to democracy, but also of 
transitions to authoritarian rule (Beetham 1991, 221).  For example, the leaders of a military 
coup will often move quickly to hold a referendum to give themselves popular endorsement 
or set up a civil regime to act in their place.  Usually, the referendum is fixed and the civil 
regime is a mere puppet government.  Yet the leaders realise that mere power—power that 
grows out of the barrel of a gun—is not enough.  They also need legitimacy. 
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 Like all political concepts, legitimacy can be understood in different and competing 
ways.  Yet as far as democratic theory is concerned, there has been a marked shift towards 
conceptions of legitimacy that centre on deliberation.  Deliberation is a form of discussion in 
which the participants carefully weigh the reasons for or against a proposed measure with a 
view to arriving at a considered judgement or decision.  So defined, deliberation presupposes 
a willingness on the part of the participants to listen with an open mind rather than sticking 
doggedly to their own prior views and positions.  Insofar as this presumption holds, the 
decisions that they reach will be based not on the force of numbers but on ‘the force of the 
better argument’ (Habermas 1984, 25).   
 Admittedly, if this were all that a deliberative conception of democratic legitimacy 
involved, it would hardly offer a very demanding test of democratic quality.  After all, the 
members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party might regularly 
deliberate among themselves.  Yet while their decisions may be carefully reasoned, 
‘authoritarian deliberation’ bears little relation to democracy (cf. He and Warren 2011).  The 
relevant desideratum is nicely encapsulated in Joshua Cohen’s claim that, in a deliberative 
democracy, ‘free deliberation among equals is the basis of legitimacy’ (Cohen 1989, 21).  
What marks deliberative democracy out as special is its emphasis on the idea that everyone is 
entitled to an equal say—deliberation is not the preserve of a chosen few but is, in principle, 
open to everyone.  As such, it will not do for the stronger members of society simply to 
discount the views of the weaker members or to ignore them altogether, since to do so would 
be to deny their standing as political equals.  But since we often cannot tell what the views of 
the weaker members are without directly hearing from them, the deliberative conception of 
legitimacy turns not just on the exchange of reasons but also on the importance of inclusion 
(Young 2000).    
 The idea that everyone is entitled to an equal say further presupposes that our claims 
will have at least some bearing on the decision that results.  In other words, it presupposes 
that our contributions to the deliberations will be consequential.  Of course, some claims may 
turn out to be misguided or misplaced.  But understanding why they are misplaced can itself 
add to the legitimacy of a decision (Mill 1991 [1861], 282).  It can help people to see more 
clearly why the decision went one way rather than another, and hence increase their 
confidence in the epistemic merits of the decision (Cohen 1986; Estlund 2007; Luskin et al. 
2014).   
This deliberative conception of legitimacy is quite unlike the conception that we find 
in much of the comparative literature on democratic transitions.  Instead of ‘free deliberation 
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among equals’, what we instead get is ‘free and fair elections’.  It is, however, hard to see 
how one could assess the fairness of an election in the absence of deliberation.  Fairness is 
never merely about being fair to oneself (though it is about that, too).  It is also about seeing 
things as others see them, understanding their reasons and weighing them in the balance 
equally with one’s own.  In saying this we do not mean to imply that, for example, 
administrative integrity (Elklit and Reynolds 2002), party competition (Lipset 2000) and 
voter turnout (IIDEA 2002) are not important indicators of electoral fairness.  Yet ultimately 
the validity of a measure can only be assessed by reference to the value that it is meant to 
capture (Foweraker and Krznaric 2000, 768).  Low voter turnout may indicate unfairness.  
But equally it may indicate nothing of the sort—it all depends on what we mean by ‘fair’ and 
why we think that that particular meaning is the best one to employ.   
Admittedly, there are those who argue that deliberative democracy is overly idealistic; 
in reality, critics claim, democratic politics is quintessentially about the pursuit of private 
interests (e.g., Shapiro 1999; Weale 2013, 39-40).  Indeed, some critics go so far as to suggest 
that deliberative democracy is simply pointless.  On this latter view, ordinary people are 
neither sufficiently informed nor sufficiently reflective to rule themselves; they are simply far 
too confused, inconsistent and ignorant to be worth consulting (Schumpeter 1942; Posner 
2003; but see Fishkin and Luskin 2005, 289).   
On the face of it, one might be tempted to say that if these criticisms hold for mature 
democracies, they must hold all the more so for transition societies.  Often, the decisive 
moment in such a transition is the point at which moderates in the government and opposition 
realise that they are caught in a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (Zartman 2001) and decide to 
make a pact (assuming that they are strong enough to do so).  In themselves, pacts do not 
look particularly promising from a deliberative perspective.  As Guillermo O’Donnell and 
Philippe Schmitter define it, a pact is ‘an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or 
justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seek to define (or better, to redefine) 
rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests 
of those entering into it’ (O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter 1986, 38).  So defined, pacts are 
neither reasoned nor inclusive nor consequential, at least not as those terms are understood 
within a deliberative framework.  For each of the select set of actors involved, the aim is not 
to carefully weigh competing arguments, but to get the best possible deal for itself.  Far from 
listening to one another with an open mind, each sees its own interests as the bottom line.  
The fact that each actor accepts that they are caught in a mutually hurting stalemate is usually 
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enough to ensure that the deal on power that results will be mutually advantageous.  But 
ultimately the interests of others in society are of no account. 
The objection here is not as forceful as it seems.  No two pacts are the same, and there 
is reason to think that some pacts are more deliberative than others.  Jon Elster (1998), for 
example, suggests that pacts which have been negotiated in public will come closer to the 
deliberative ideal (or to the deliberative end of the ‘arguing-bargaining continuum’) than 
those that have been negotiated in secret.  The operative assumption here is that there are 
powerful social norms against naked appeals to private interests.  Hence, when pacts are 
publicly negotiated, actors will feel obliged to couch their proposals in public interest terms 
and will be concerned to be seen to reflect seriously on what others have to say.  On the face 
of it, one might think that such deliberative moves are mere strategic ploys: actors dress their 
private interests up in public interest terms, because they see that as the best way to increase 
their own payoff.  Yet as Elster points out, actors have to avoid being too obvious—if their 
claims about the public interest map perfectly onto their own private interests, they may end 
up losing rather than gaining support for their proposals (Elster 1998, 102).  As a result, their 
proposals will be modified as well as disguised, which is to say that the deliberative setting 
will shape the content of the pact independently of the intentions of the select set of actors 
involved in its negotiation (Elster 1998, 104).   
The general point, then, is that broader social norms will have a bearing on how much 
deliberation actually occurs during the negotiation of a pact.  Put another way, a pact will not 
be negotiated in isolation from the broader social world, since even the most strategically 
rational actors will bring social baggage with them (Schiemann 2000).  At the same time, the 
signing of a pact may itself have an effect on the broader social world: in principle, one 
would expect a pact to occasion a tremendous amount of discussion and debate across society 
at large—not just between the select set of actors or their supporters, but across civil society 
generally, in neighbouring countries, and within the institutions of the international 
community.  In practice, however, the fact remains much will depend on the nature of the 
pact in question. 
Thus, in order to get a handle on a transition society’s overall deliberative capacity, 
what needs to be assessed is not just the deliberative character of the pact on which it rests, 
but the degree to which the pact encourages or stymies deliberation at other points or 
locations in the broader ‘deliberative system’ (Habermas 1996, 204-308; Dryzek 2010, 2011; 
Mansbridge et al. 2012).  In what follows, we explain in more detail what we mean by the 
idea of a deliberative system.  We then outline a framework that operationalises that idea for 
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the purposes of empirical research (cf. Elstub 2014; Cinalli and O’Flynn 2014) and in 
particular for measuring a transition society’s actual deliberative capacity.   
 
Assessing democratic quality deliberatively 
 
Currently, studies that examine the role of deliberation in instigating major political change 
mostly focus on the role of ‘argumentation’ in formal political negotiations.  Thomas Risse’s 
work, for example, has examined negotiations on the European Union’s single legal 
personality (Risse and Kleine 2010) and negotiations leading to the end of the Cold War in 
Europe (Risse 2000).  While both studies take into account the broader political context that 
serves as a backdrop to the negotiations, the analysis is mostly focused on deliberative 
politics within a formal institutional setting.  A deliberative systems approach is also 
concerned with deliberation in formal institutional settings.  However, it broadens the 
analysis to include a consideration of the many other spaces where deliberation occurs and 
the mechanisms that have enhanced or obstructed its development.  
 Before discussing the precise ways in which a deliberative systems approach can be 
used to assess a transition’s democratic quality, the following point should be stressed.  
Conceptually, the notion of a ‘system’ tends to evoke an image of a coherent structure 
composed of interrelated parts performing particular functions to attain the system’s goals.  
The democratic system, for example, is often conceived as comprising the formal-legal 
institutions that constitute the democratic state, with each of these institutions performing 
specific tasks to maintain popular rule.  By contrast, a deliberative systems approach is not 
exclusively tied to the institutional configurations of the democratic state.  As John Dryzek 
puts it, ‘we can imagine deliberative systems without, say, a legislature, or internally 
deliberative parties, or designed forums, or elections’ (Dryzek 2009, 15).   Accordingly, the 
aim is to map all of the different sites or locations where deliberation occurs as well as the 
mechanisms that facilitate their interaction.  The basic question to be answered is to what 
degree these sites and mechanisms contribute to a transition’s deliberative capacity—or to its 
overall ability to host inclusive, reasoned and consequential deliberation.   
 Dryzek has already suggested that a deliberative systems approach is suitable for 
analysing democratic transitions (Dryzek 2009).  In what follows, we give shape and 
substance to this suggestion by outlining a framework for describing both the spaces where 
deliberation occurs and how those spaces relate to each other, as well as for evaluating the 
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extent to which inclusive and reasoned deliberation determines the outcomes of the transition 
process.   
 
Descriptive task 
 
 As just indicated, the descriptive task is composed of two sub-tasks.  The first sub-
task is to map the spaces where deliberation actually occurs.  These spaces can be categorised 
as public space or empowered space.  The former refers to deliberative forums where 
ordinary people meet to discuss the issues that concern them and where public opinion is 
generated; the latter refers to deliberative forums where authoritative decisions are made.  In 
stable democracies, civil society organisations are the usual interlocutors in the public space, 
while, for example, elected politicians and the judiciary are the usual interlocutors in the 
empowered space.  In transitional democracies, the empowered space will often be occupied 
by members of the government and the opposition who seek to agree a pact, whereas the 
public space will be occupied not just by their respective supporters, but also by those who 
think of themselves as belonging to neither camp and who may have radically different views 
on democracy and democratization. 
 The second sub-task is to identify the connectors of the deliberative system.  Ideally, 
the public and empowered spaces are meaningfully linked to each other through mechanisms 
of transmission and accountability.  Transmission refers to a system’s capacity to 
communicate views generated in the public space to the empowered space—this may be via 
campaigns, lobbying, protests, petitions or the direct persuasion of decision-makers through 
face-to-face discussions.  By contrast, accountability mechanisms enable or require actors in 
the empowered space to justify their decisions to actors in the public space.  In transitions, 
formal accountability mechanisms such as parliamentary oversight committees or the 
judiciary may be weak or non-existent.  However, this absence need not necessarily curtail a 
transition’s deliberative capacity if informal accountability mechanisms such as the press and 
social media are both free and strong enough to hold actors in the empowered space to 
account. 
 
Evaluative task 
 
 The evaluative task assesses descriptive characterisations in relation to the standards 
of democratic deliberation—reason-giving, inclusion and consequentiality, as we defined 
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them above.  The theoretical literature on deliberative democracy recognises that each part of 
the system cannot plausibly be expected to uphold all three standards at the same time 
(Goodin 2005).  But once again the basic idea is ‘to look at the deliberative system in its 
entirety, rather than assess component parts in isolation’ (Dryzek 2010, 13-14).  Hence, the 
challenge is to examine how weak deliberative capacity in one part of the political system 
may be compensated for by strong deliberative capacity in another and vice versa.  
 For example, the public space can be the space for inclusive deliberation—in 
principle, the public space is open to everyone.  However, its dispersed and mediated nature 
precludes a substantive exchange of reasons among interlocutors (cf. Bohman 1996, 34).  By 
contrast, the empowered space might compensate for this weakness if the relevant actors are 
both representative and prepared to weigh competing arguments in the balance.  Public and 
empowered spaces can therefore be assessed in terms of inclusion and reason-giving, while 
the system’s transmission and accountability mechanisms can be evaluated in terms of the 
extent to which deliberative contributions are consequential with respect to determining 
collective outcomes.  Figure 1 below summarises this evaluative framework in schematic 
form.  
 
Figure 1: The deliberative system in action 
 
 
 
Case studies  
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We now illustrate how this evaluative framework can be used to assess a transition’s 
democratic quality.  We compare two countries, Venezuela and Poland, whose post-
authoritarian political trajectories has been strongly influenced by the character of the pacts 
on which they rests.  We conclude by underscoring the added value of a deliberative systems 
approach. 
 
Venezuela’s Pact of Punto Fijo 
 
Scholars of contemporary Venezuelan history often identify the Pact of Punto Fijo as 
the critical historical juncture that has shaped the country’s democratic trajectory after the fall 
of the Marcos Pérez Jiménez military regime in 1958.  The main aim of the pact was to 
resolve the instability brought about by military coups—like many other Latin American 
countries, Venezuela had a history of ‘strongmen’ seizing power.  After the Pérez regime was 
forcibly removed from office, two major political parties, Accion Democratica (AD) and 
Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), sought to find ways to 
manage inter-elite competition without resorting to force.  The main outcomes of the pact 
were respect for the outcome of elections, the rejection of military intervention in times of 
crisis, ‘reconciliation of old antagonisms’ and the postponing of decisions on contentious 
issues (such as wealth redistribution) that might compromise democratic stability (Levine 
1989).  But what might one say about the democratic quality of the pact when viewed a 
deliberative systems perspective?    
 The empowered space was the primary locus of deliberations aimed at reaching an 
agreement on Venezuela’s post-authoritarian political arrangements.  Aside from COPEI and 
AD, participants included representatives from the business sector, the ‘ecclesiastical elites’ 
and segments of the military that opposed the Pérez regime (Myers 2004).  Both supporters 
and critics of Punto Fijismo describe the pact as an ‘inter-elite consensus’.  Agreements were 
forged behind closed doors without input from popular movements in the public space.  The 
pact intentionally excluded parties, such as AD’s left-wing factions and the Venezuelan 
Communist Party, whose views might have made military officers and businessmen 
‘uncomfortable’ during the process of consensus building.  In other words, pact-making 
occurred in an enclave of party and non-party elites who shared common interests in building 
a ‘stable democracy’ through regular inter-elite electoral competition.  Hence, deliberations 
in the empowered space were largely exclusionary.  
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 The precise quality of reason-giving in this pact is difficult to assess but one might 
plausibly argue that pact-making created a space for deliberation between previously 
antagonistic parties and instituted means of working out political differences.  Because the 
participants were familiar with each other’s interests, they were able to generate ‘meta-
consensus’ (Niemeyer and Dryzek  2007) on the legitimacy of different views, albeit without 
reaching final agreement on all contentious issues.  This necessarily required the sort 
reflective distance that deliberation entails.  As Daniel Levine puts it:  
 
The parties did not agree on all substantive policy issues.  Indeed, one might well 
characterise the situation as an agreement to disagree—setting difficult and potentially 
explosive issues aside to concentrate on incremental reform and technical solutions 
(Levine 1989, 51).  
 
Reaching agreements through deliberation between party and non-party elites is no small 
feat.  For four decades, the pact has proven to be durable as it has successfully withstood the 
threats of armed guerrillas, disgruntled military officers, urban rioters and the wave of 
authoritarianism in Latin America (Myers 2004, 11).  Power has been peacefully transferred 
from one elected regime to another, leading observers of third wave democracies to coin the 
phrase ‘Venezuelan exceptionalism’ (Neuhouser 1992).  The source of elite legitimacy was 
based on norms of civility and mutual guarantees that the interests of all parties to the pact 
would be considered when crafting political decisions.  Power sharing in cabinet positions 
also facilitated deliberation among opposing parties as they engaged in co-governance 
(Myers 2004, 20; see O’Flynn 2010, 586).   
 However, while elite pact-making was able to create spaces for inter-elite 
deliberation, it also institutionalised the disconnection of consequential deliberations from the 
public space.  While Punto Fijismo accommodated industrial unions, professional 
organisations and peasant leagues in their power-sharing agreements (Myers 2004, 20), 
political engagement and transmission of views from the public space was limited to the 
terms of party politics.  Contestations from movements outside of this formal arrangement 
were marginalised by invoking the virtue of ‘democratic stability.’  
An example of this latter practice was the drafting of the 1961 Constitution.  Instead 
of convening a constituent assembly of popularly elected representatives, a special 
commission composed of handpicked delegates was convened to bar the access of ‘disruptive 
personalities’ to the process.  As a consequence, the special commission ‘and its deliberations 
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did not attain the resonance and popular attention which characterised the previous process’ 
because ‘it was far less participatory than the one that led to the enactment of the 1947 
Constitution’ (Kornblith 1991, 74).  Unlike in 1947, the constitutional process was not 
broadcast live on radio or television, precluding the public from reacting and shaping the 
terms of constitutional deliberations.  
Crisp observes that the practice of isolating policy making from popular participation 
and using party politics as a vehicle for elite interests has been the defining characteristic of 
Venezuela’s Punto Fijo democracy (Crisp 1994, 1505).  As a consequence, public-opinion 
polls in Venezuela rank political parties as the least credible institution, particularly as they 
fail to engage with social movements, church-based groups, neighbourhood associations and 
indigenous movements that contest the terms of Punto Fijismo, particularly its failure to 
redistribute oil wealth.  One consequence of the pact of Punto Fijo, therefore, is that 
accountability mechanisms, which in theory should render the empowered space answerable 
to the public space, have remained weak.  As Jennifer McCoy notes, the party system and 
legislature answer to party elites rather than citizen constituents, which suggests that Punto 
Fijismo has been deficient in deepening deliberative capacity and, consequently, democratic 
quality (McCoy 2004, 285).   
Overall Venezuela’s post-authoritarian deliberative system is characterised by an 
empowered space that was able to forge commitments between previously antagonistic 
parties to institutionalise deliberation and maintain ‘democratic stability.’  The casualties of 
this agreement, however, are political actors that contest the terms of Punto Fijismo and the 
delimitation of transmission and accountability mechanisms to elections and co-governance 
mechanisms within the scope of party politics.  Because Venezuela’s deliberative system is 
unable to play host to the circulation of contesting views in the public space, it is left 
vulnerable to ‘political outbursts’ as expressions of popular discontent.  In 1989, for example, 
Caracas witnessed a week of bloody rioting sparked by a sharp increase in transport fares.  At 
the time of writing, it is witnessing more of the same (see, e.g., Neuman 2014).   
Granted, the emergence of Hugo Chavez changed the terms of exclusionary politics 
by challenging the concentration of power to party elites.  However, we suggest that the 
patterns of a system with weak deliberative capacity remain.  Actors in the public space are 
still precluded from transmitting their concerns to the empowered space if they diverge from 
the ‘Bolivarian consensus’ concerning, for example, the redistribution of oil wealth through 
state-sponsored social programs.  Like Punto Fijismo, Chavez institutionalised enclave 
deliberation—while there have been numerous accounts of deliberations within his party, the 
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United Socialist Party of Venezuela, as well as within community councils, these 
deliberations remain closed to those with different views.  Lacking mechanisms of 
transmission and accountability, and hence deliberative capacity more generally, it is our 
contention that Venezuela’s democracy will remain vulnerable to ‘political outbursts’ in the 
future.  In particular, we contend that the attempted military coup of 2002 and the massive 
wave of protests in 2014 are manifestations of a democracy that lacks the capacity for inter-
class, inter-ethnic and inter-party deliberation.  Without mechanisms for competing groups to 
generate meta-consensus on the legitimacy of each other’s claims, opposing political actors 
will continue to treat each other as enemies to be eradicated instead of interlocutors worthy of 
engagement.  
 
Poland’s roundtable negotiations 
 
Like Venezuela’s, Poland’s democratic transition was built on a negotiated pact.  By 1988, 
the Communist regime and the dissident labour movement Solidarity had reached an impasse.  
On the one side, the regime’s economic reforms were not taking off, resulting in alarming 
rates of inflation and deteriorating economic conditions.  On the other, Solidarity, together 
with student movements, launched a wave of strikes demanding wage increases and the 
restoration of civil and political rights but could not mobilise sufficient public support to 
break the political deadlock (Glenn 2003, 106).  As the economy further deteriorated, both 
sides agreed to convene roundtable talks to avert further crises.  These talks resulted in key 
agreements which set in motion a series of gradual, yet non-violent, democratic 
transformations.  These included holding partially free elections (seats for the opposition 
were capped to 35% in the Sejm, or lower house of the bicameral national assembly, while 
seats in the Senate, or upper house, had no cap), giving airtime to opposition groups on radio 
and television, and restoring the right to organise by movements banned under martial law.  
These concessions could be viewed as modest victories for oppositional civil society but, we 
suggest, can also be viewed as products of deliberation, albeit with imperfections.   
 Prior to the roundtable talks, the relationship between the public space and the 
empowered space was antagonistic rather than deliberative.  The public space’s main 
transmission mechanisms were strikes and protests that paralysed Poland’s economic 
productivity.  The empowered space responded through force by jailing dissidents and 
maintaining tight control over the media (Osiatynski 1996, 23).  The roundtable talks 
changed the character of contestation.  While strategic bargaining may have been very much 
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to the fore, there was also deliberation—in part at least, the transmission of views between 
both sides was structured in such a way as to resolve shared problems by generating mutually 
acceptable (as opposed to mutually advantageous) agreements.  In this spirit, Elzbieta 
Matynia (2009) uses the metaphor of the ‘kapia’—the square on a bridge where people who 
otherwise would not meet could talk and get to know each other—to describe this 
deliberative aspect of the talks.   
Unlike the Venezuelan case in which deliberations aimed at reaching an agreement on 
post-authoritarian political arrangements were limited to economic and party elites, the 
roundtable talks created a shared space between oppositional civil society and the ruling 
regime.  There were 58 delegates: 29 from the ruling party and 26 from the opposition, and 
three observers from the Catholic Church.  Initially, Solidarity attempted to frame the 
roundtable talks as a bilateral discussion between itself and the ruling party, but they were 
later convinced to broaden the scope of representation to include another labour union, the 
All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), as well as professional and artists’ associations 
(Osiatynski 1996, 33).  To this extent, the democracy that emerged from the 
Namiestnikowski Palace was a product of a more inclusive process than the one that emerged 
from Punto Fijo. 
 To keep roundtable discussions focused, the talks were organised into subgroups on 
political reform, union pluralism and economic and social issues.  Official representatives had 
access to issue-area experts with ‘less immediately identifiable associations’ (Osiatynski 
1996, 31).  The talks were described as having a ‘rather striking absence of animosity’ 
(Korbonski 1999, 152; Matynia 2009).  There were moments of reasoning in other-regarding 
temrs, such as when representatives of Solidarity occasionally asked their counterparts, 
‘Would the Soviets accept far-reaching change?’, especially when their own demands 
appeared ‘too radical’ and risked compromising the talks’ stability (Osiatynski 1996, 25).  
Some may view this as Solidarity’s giving in to the regime’s decision-making framework, but 
one could also view it as an expression of a willingness to take the position of one’s 
interlocutor into account for the sake of sustaining the deliberations.  As the private secretary 
of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Czesław Kiszczak, puts it, ‘The authorities eventually saw 
that the people facing them were not enemies or foreign agents but normal people who were 
thinking in terms of the national interest’ (in European Network Remembrance and Solidarity 
2014).  Thus, while the talks were influenced by self-interested calculations, it is equally 
important to acknowledge that these roundtables had ‘deliberative drifts’ (McLaverty and 
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Halpin 2008) or moments of reason-giving with the aim of persuading the other to generate 
workable agreements.   
 Built into these roundtable discussions were mechanisms to link deliberation between 
the regime and the opposition to the public space.  Unlike the Pact of Punto Fijo, which was 
forged behind closed doors and without public participation, the Polish roundtables were 
broadcast live on radio and television.  Aside from gaining a platform to present their views 
to the public for the first time, this opening also communicated what Elster describes as a 
‘symbolic statement’:  
 
the time of secret decisions and deals was over … having the talks take place in public 
favoured ‘the civilizing force of hypocrisy’: the role of threat and force became 
secondary to that of argument and reason (Elster 1996, 10).  
 
Accountability mechanisms were also in place.  Solidarity organised weekly public meetings 
in a movie theatre in Warsaw to provide feedback and justify their positions to actors in the 
public space.  Osiatynski suggests that Solidarity had the capacity to institute this practice 
because of its ‘tradition of openness’ since the 1980s, when it demanded that the Gdansk 
shipyard strike negotiations be broadcast live to all striking workers (Osiatynski 1996, 49).  
These accountability mechanisms are particularly important because Solidarity did not have 
Polish society’s unconditional support.  Public opinion polls from 1988 indicate that the 
number of those who considered the strikers’ demands to be ‘not just’ was twice as high as 
the number who consider them to be ‘just’ (Glenn 2003, 107).  Moreover, the sheer scale of 
Solidarity as a movement, with over ten million members, made it ‘extraordinarily 
heterogeneous’, composed of peasants, workers, intellectuals, liberals and conservatives 
harbouring a range of views (Grodsky 2012, 40).  Such accountability mechanisms within the 
public space allowed the movement to bridge various divisions and consider a range of views 
which could be put forward forward in negotiations while at the same time foregrounding the 
movement’s consensus—its ethical voice—about the importance of making the regime 
accountable to the Polish people and achieving their goals through non-violent means 
(Grodsky 2012, 41).  Put another way, the ‘parallel polity’ Solidarity built in the 1980s was 
maintained during the negotiations, this time transforming its language of contestatory 
demand-making into that of finding a deliberative common ground.  
 A decade after the Polish roundtable, scholars and commentators have declared 
Poland to be a ‘stable democracy’ (e.g., Kramer 2002).  Unlike Venezuela, Poland has not 
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experienced ‘political outbursts’ that put into question the legitimacy of agreements formed 
in the roundtable negotiations.  The conduct of the talks set the tone for politics after the 
Solidarity-led government was formed (Osiatynski 1996, 32).  Prolonged engagements 
among members of Solidarity, the opposition and the communist regime allowed feelings of 
‘fear, anger and hatred’ to subside and helped develop shared understandings necessary to 
govern as Poland transitioned to a democratic regime (Osiatynski 1996, 31).   
The immediate challenge of the Solidarity-led empowered space, however, was to 
respond to the demands of those who remained in the public space, especially as the public 
space reverted to strikes and protest as transmission mechanisms.  ‘Institutionalised 
contentiousness’ was the term Grzegorz Ekriert and Jan Kubik (1999) used to describe this 
relationship.  Initially, this form of contention demonstrated the capacity of the public space 
to mobilise and hold their representatives accountable.  However, the empowered space’s 
capacity to make decisions that were responsive to what was going on in the public space was 
severely limited by the demands of a market economy.  As Poland received ‘economic shock 
therapy’ from international financial institutions, ‘the possibility of careful deliberation on 
Poland’s economic strategies among a wide range of economists was trumped by [Jeffrey] 
Sach’s  [the architect of Poland’s transition to capitalism] insistence on the need to act 
quickly and decisively’ (Zeniewski 2011, 985).  Over time, this resulted in a decline in 
Solidarity’s membership and a weakening of the public space’s deliberative capacity.  Today, 
one of the major ‘democratic deficits’ in Poland relates to low voter turnout, poor 
government trust rating and low membership in volunteer and civil society organisations 
(Markowski 2012).  Ironically, whereas exclusionary pact-making in Venezuela invigorated a 
contentious public space, the deliberative capacity of Poland’s once influential public space 
has been tempered by market-driven imperatives and corresponding mistrust of the 
empowered space. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have sought to demonstrate the importance of deliberative theory to 
democratic transitions.  Central to deliberative theory is a notion of democratic legitimacy in 
which free deliberation among equals is what matters most.  Of course, the idea that 
deliberative theory might have something important to say about democratic transitions may 
come as a surprise to some.  After all, deliberative democracy can seem utopian at the best of 
times.  However, as we have argued, scepticism of this sort can be allayed by thinking about 
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deliberation, and the conception of democratic legitimacy with which it is bound up, in 
systemic terms.  The ‘systemic turn’ in deliberative theory is relatively recent and many 
questions have yet to be answered.  However, we have sought to demonstrate its interpretive 
potential by outlining a framework for analysing and comparing democratic transitions and 
for assessing their democratic quality in deliberative terms. 
Admittedly, the framework is suggestive rather than definitive.  For example, while in 
theory the idea of a transmission mechanism is clear enough, empirically it is an open 
question as to how exactly we might measure the extent to which deliberation in one arena 
influences deliberation in another.   By the same token, we currently have little sense of just 
how far public and empowered space overlap or whether it is really possible to draw strong 
lines between the two.  Yet even as it stands, we think that the framework we have outlined is 
powerful enough to influence thinking about policy.  In particular, we have shown how our 
framework might enable policy makers and others in the democracy promotion community 
not just to assess the democratic quality of a transition country in terms of its deliberative 
capacity, but to get a handle on their very different democratic trajectories—as our 
comparison of Venezuela and Poland sought to show.  In saying this, we do not mean to 
discount the importance of more traditional indicators.  It may be that a more developed 
framework would be able to show where those more traditional indicators connect up with a 
deliberative systems approach.  Ultimately, however, we have argued that deliberation should 
be fundamental to our thinking about democratic deepening in transition societies.  After all, 
the fairness of an election must itself be premised upon deliberation.   
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